Risk Identification Toolkit

Researchers should assess whether a proposed collaboration may be subject to Canadian or allied sanctions.

OpenSanctions is a free, searchable database that aggregates more than 120 sources, including sanctions lists, databases of politically exposed persons and other public-interest records. It includes the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List and can serve as a useful initial screening tool.

Researchers should exercise caution when providing technical assistance, transferring goods, sharing technology or facilitating the movement of funds involving sanctioned countries, organizations or individuals, including those designated by key allies such as the United States. Violating Canadian sanctions may constitute a criminal offence and can result in significant personal, professional and institutional consequences.

For ease of reference, the following research-intensive institutions and private-sector R&D organizations were subject to Canadian sanctions as of February 2026:

• AI Alliance Russia
• Al-Mustafa International University
• Baghyatollah Medical Sciences University
• Federal Scientific and Production Centre “Scientific Research Institute for Applied Chemistry” (FNPC NII Prikladnoy Khimii)
• Higher School of Economics University in Russia
• Iman Hossein University
• Institute of Automation and Electrometry (Siberian Branch, RAS)
• ITMO University National Centre for Quantum Internet
• Kapitza Institute for Physics Problems
• Kazan National Research Technical University’s Kazan Quantum Centre
• Malek Ashtar University
• Moscow State University Quantum Technology Centre
• National Quantum Laboratory
• National Research Centre Kurchatov Institute
• National University of Science and Technology Centre for Quantum Communications
• National University of Science and Technology Laboratory of Superconductor Quantum Technologies
• Novosibirsk State University Interdisciplinary Quantum Centre
• NtechLab
• Positive Technologies
• QApp
• QBoard
• QRate
• QSpace Technologies
• Quantum Communications Company
• Red Soft
• Rosatom Digital Solutions
• Rusnano Visitors
• Russian Artificial Intelligence Research Institute (RAIRI)
• Shahid Beheshti University (overall institution including its Department of Engineering)
• Shahid Sattari Air Force University
• Sharif University of Technology (only its Department of Engineering)
• Skoltech – Project Center for Applied Photonics and Quantum Technologies
• VizorLabs

The Government of Canada uses several regulatory tools to prevent the misuse, diversion or proliferation of sensitive technologies, materials and knowledge. Researchers should consider whether their work may be subject to:

• The Controlled Goods Program, which regulates goods, technologies and technical data with military or national security significance;
• Export and border controls, which restrict the transfer of certain goods, technologies and expertise to foreign destinations, organizations or individuals;
• The Human Pathogens and Toxins Act licensing program, which governs activities involving prescribed human pathogens and toxins; and
• The Canadian Biosafety Standard, which helps identify dual-use life sciences research (figure 3-1) and outlines the relevant international biosafety and biosecurity frameworks (chapter 4).

Canada’s Sensitive Technology Research Areas (STRA) list identifies 11 research areas that support the development of emerging technologies. The key consideration is whether the proposed research will advance a sensitive technology. Research that simply uses an existing technology, without contributing to its development or enhancement, is generally not within scope.

The Government of Canada’s Emerging Technology Trend Cards can help identify technologies with potential civilian and military applications.

The National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships (NSGRP) provide additional guidance for assessing national security risks in research collaborations. Beyond the STRAs, the NSGRP’s Annex A identifies risk considerations related to critical minerals, critical infrastructure and research involving large datasets or sensitive personal information (see section 8(xi)).

This consideration is particularly relevant to research that advances a Sensitive Technology Research Area or involves other sensitive fields, including critical minerals, critical infrastructure and research involving large or personal datasets.

Several publicly available resources can help identify foreign universities, laboratories and research institutes that may present elevated research security risks, including:

• Canada’s Named Research Organizations (NRO) list (2024);
• The U.S. Department of War’s Section 1286 List of Foreign Institutions Engaging in Problematic Activities (2026);
• ETH Zurich’s Security-Relevant Research Screening List (2025); and
• The Henry Jackson Society Research Brief, which draws on ASPI data to identify high-risk defence-affiliated institutions in Russia and Iran (2022).

Inclusion on one of these lists does not automatically preclude collaboration. However, affiliations with listed organizations may warrant enhanced due diligence and a more detailed assessment of potential national security, research security, legal and reputational risks.

This risk control is especially pertinent for collaboration in or with countries against which Canada has imposed sanctions and related measures.

Researchers should consider potential human rights concerns, alignment with academic values, risks to researcher safety (including pressure, coercion or foreign interference) and the potential for unwanted knowledge transfer or diversion.

For collaborations involving public or public-private enterprises, including their Canadian subsidiaries, researchers should seek to understand the organization’s ownership structure and beneficial ownership. This information may be available through the partner’s website, corporate registries, business registries, legal entity databases and the Government of Canada’s Inter-Corporate Ownership Product.

Additional risk indicators may be identified through investment screening resources, such as World Bank and Investment Canada databases, as well as end-user screening lists, including the U.S. Consolidated Screening List, the U.S. Chinese Military Companies (1260 H) list and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) End User List, which is notable for its coverage of Central Asian entities.

Researchers should consider whether funding sources, institutional affiliations or external commitments could signal a real, perceived or potential conflict of interest, or conflict of commitment.  Indicators may be identified through:

• Patent filings and assignee information;
• Institutional affiliations listed in publications, preprints and researcher profiles; and
• Funding sources, sponsors and acknowledgements identified in publications.

Note that activities undertaken as part of a Malign Foreign Talent Program may place researchers in a perceived or actual conflict of interest or conflict of commitment, implicating institutional policies and the Tri-Agency Framework: Responsible Conduct of Research. A Malign Foreign Talent Program is organized, managed or funded by a foreign government or state-influenced entity. It aims to acquire proprietary technology, data, intellectual property (IP) or other information to benefit the goals of a foreign state at the expense of Canadian research institutes or Canadian national security interests, through the guise of recruiting individuals to carry out research activities and/or by providing individuals with various benefits or incentives.

The federal government’s Risk Assessment Form articulates that when considering transparency and unethical behaviour(s), researchers “should focus on events that occurred within the last five years and those that took place prior to the last five years that may have a lasting impact.” This direction can be used to signpost your queries and ensure that you are reasonably aware of professional and corporate activity.

For additional guidance on conducting open-source due diligence, researchers are encouraged to consult the Government of Canada’s Conducting Open Source Due Diligence for Safeguarding Research Partnerships guide and the Safeguarding Research Partnerships with Open Source Due Diligence training course. These resources provide additional data sources and a practical methodology for conducting due diligence, including guidance on queries of corporate records, provincial registries, intellectual property and patent databases, and other publicly available sources. They also offer a high-level framework and a series of guiding questions to support the assessment of potential research partners and collaborations.